TRANSNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: MISALIGNMENTS BETWEEN REGULATION, BUSINESS MODELS AND USER PRACTICE

"If economic losses are an indication of a crime's seriousness, and if current estimates are to be believed, then film 'piracy' constitutes a crime--wave nearing epidemic proportions."
Since the 1970s, the regulation of copyright law has developed from a very specialized legal field to one of the most controversial areas in international politics (Sell and Prakadesh 2004) .
The regulation of property and exploitation rights of intangible goods has increasingly become an issue of social and political contestation, both in public and private arenas (Dobusch and Quack 2012) . In the course of these contestations, notions of legality and illegality of usage practices in the internet are both subject and means of discursive struggles over what constitutes socially acceptable and legitimate practices and what should be considered as inappropriate and illegitimate. In these struggles, the actors seem to assume and maintain that legality and illegality are clear--cut, well--defined and generally accepted notions beyond any doubt. In this paper, on the contrary, we argue that this is by no means the case. We demonstrate that the legality and illegality of internet usage practices are socially constructed notions which have been changing over time and are likely to do so in the future as a result of shifting social power relations. In particular, we maintain that in the context of online copyright infringement, the notion of "consuming the illegal" is misleading in at least two regards.
First, the (il--)legality of many online consumption practices has been and still is far from clear.
In the course of the diffusion of new technological developments, the borders between legal and illegal activities are regularly adjusted or even re--drawn (Wu 2010) . Such processes of (re--)defining the (il--)legality of certain practices involve both state and non--state actors who engage in what Black (2002: 163) terms "regulatory conversations", i.e. "communicative interactions that occur between all involved in the regulatory 'space'". Especially in the realm of business, what eventually is considered to be illegal is thus the outcome of continuous and, according to Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 32) 'surprisingly deliberative' regulatory contests.
In the field of copyright regulation, the set of practices considered 'illegal' has been neither stable over time nor across geographical boundaries. Both corporate and individual actors face -and may even try to create or exploit -this regulatory uncertainty. To address the issue of 4 OSGOODE CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 08 NO.04] "consuming the illegal" therefore requires answering the questions, who defines what is considered as legal or illegal in rapidly changing environments?
Second, the notion of "consumption" is increasingly inadequate or insufficient to describe a growing portion of online usage practices. 'Consuming' digital content online increasingly implies creatively transforming it and making it publicly available as user--generated content (UGC, see Elkin--Koren 2009 ), leading to neologism such as "prosumer" or "produser" (Bruns 2006 ). Even when taking into account that only a minority of users will actively interact with a certain piece of work while the majority will just consume it (van Dijck 2009), it remains a fact that, on the whole, consumption of online content regularly and routinely interferes with extant copyright provisions. This user behavior, however, is enabled by corporate services, which -if not require -tempt such (potentially) infringing usage practices. Examples are online video sharing platforms such as Google's YouTube (see Cha et al. 2007; Bajde 2010) or online social networks such as Facebook. Consequently, the legality of consumption practices is not only in doubt but also these consumption practices themselves are constantly changing. In turn, newly emerging consumption and usage practices tend to feed back into regulatory processes (e.g. through court decisions), thereby further enhancing regulatory uncertainty for all
participants.
In what follows, we want to reflect on the interrelationship between these two issuesregulatory uncertainty and changing user and business practices -in the field of transnational copyright regulation. Conceptualizing transnational regulation as an outcome of distributed agency (Quack 2007 ) requires a recursive perspective (Luhmann 2004; Nobles and Schiff 2009) which situates the application of the code legal/illegal occurs in regulatory conversations which form part of a broader regulatory system. As a consequence, there is no final and last authority deciding on the question of (il--)legality. Rather, various and competing actors, claiming authority to do so co--construct the demarcation between legal and illegal in the form of regulatory and non--regulatory practices and arbitral verdicts.
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Origins of Regulatory Uncertainty in the Field of Copyright
To some degree, uncertainty is an inherent feature of any legal or regulatory framework.
Following rules always implies subsuming idiosyncratic situations under generalized prescriptions. These generalized prescriptions may come in form of specific rules or vague principles (Braithwaite 2002) , but even the most specific prescriptions contain (at least a grain of) indeterminacy. In arbitration or any due process of law, this indeterminacy is in turn the motivation for opposing parties to submit to the process in the first place and, eventually, to accept decisions (Luhmann 2004 ).
In transnational governance, however, regulatory uncertainty is enhanced and multiplied by the lack of a universally recognized single authority in charge of law--making and the indeterminacy arising from the variety and distinctiveness of local contexts in which legal rules have to be applied. In the copyright field, we identify (1) international regime complexity, (2) regulatory asymmetries and ambiguities, and (3) regulatory drift as the major reasons why actors struggle with drawing the line between the legal and the illegal.
(a) Regime complexity
According to Alter and Meunier (2009: 16) , "international regime complexity reduces the clarity of legal obligation by introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictions governing an issue." Especially the lack of hierarchy distinguishes international from domestic regime complexity, albeit only "few studies and even fewer theories are available to guide scholars in thinking about the consequences of this complexity" (Alter and Meunier 2009: 13) .
One consequence and source of regime complexity at the same time is the proliferation of forum--shifting tactics, where "[p]arties might move an agenda from one forum to another, exit a forum altogether […] , or pursue agendas simultaneously in multiple forums" (Sell 2010: 2) . In addition to forum shopping in the political sphere, actors may also turn to private regulatory endeavors via standards (see Table 1 ), underlining Drahos' (2007) observation that "some negotiations are never really over". 
TRANSNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: MISALIGNMENTS BETWEEN REGULATION, BUSINESS MODELS AND USER PRACTICE
Regime complexity in the sense as we use it in the following is constituted by both overlaps of different functional regulatory regimes, as well as overlaps of different jurisdictional layers within a given functional multi--level regime. In the field of transnational copyright regulation, we find at least three overlapping regimes with related forums and distinct regulatory outcomes on both the transnational and the national level (see Table 1 ). In all these regimes we can observe actors pursuing (at least: partially) contradictory agendas in different forums. In the cases of international treaties and (supra--)national legislation, regulation is negotiated and conflicts have to be resolved in each forum, leading actors to pursue forum shopping strategies (Helfer 2004; Raustiala and Victor 2004) . In the case of private regulation via standards, we find competing attempts of regulation with conflicts being resolved either in form of negotiation within certain forums or via competition for dominance among potential standard adopters (Dobusch and Quack 2012) .
(b) Regulatory asymmetries and ambiguities
Another source for uncertainty are regulatory asymmetries in terms of how specific provisions are crafted. Specificity may vary between different regimes or between different levels.
Especially in the realm of international treaties "[n]egotiators adopt broad rules because it is extremely difficult to work out the fine detail for all contingencies ex ante." (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 302) . (Un--)Specificity is however not equally distributed within a regulatory regime. According to Wielsch (2010: 3) an "early asymmetry in the international copyright regime" is that "in the Berne Convention only the minimum standard of protection was mandatory whereas exceptions and limitations were discretionary and without any force in the absence of state action."
Even one of the core provisions of transnational copyright regulation, the so--called "three--step test" dealing with exceptions and limitations to copyright protection (see, for example, articles 13 in the TRIPS Agreement) 2 , is an example for regulatory asymmetries and ambiguities. The Furthermore, specificity may vary across distinct but interlinked subjects even within one regime, something Yu (2007: 28) refers to as "issue--based conflicts". Compare, for example, the broad rules based upon the three--step test with the concrete and specific provisions dealing with (the circumvention of) copy protection measures in articles 11 and 12 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
Assessing the consequences of these asymmetries for the degree of regulatory uncertainty may then be further complicated when taking Braithwaite's (2002) arguments on legal certainty into account. As mentioned above, Braithwaite convincingly argues that regulation in form of specific prescriptions need not necessarily lead to greater certainty than unspecific or vague principles. His main hypothesis reads as follows:
"As the complexity, flux and size of regulated economic interests increase, certainty progressively moves from being positively associated with the specificity of acts mandated by rules to being negatively associated with rule specificity." (Braithwaite 2002: 52) Asymmetries in terms of specificity are further complemented by ambiguities, which may have been intentionally built into regulatory devices (Yu 2007) . The TRIPS agreement, for instance, includes several passages that are not only vague but allow for different interpretations and represent, at least according to Watal (2001) "constructive ambiguities", in that they preserve at least some national legislatory leeway (see also Raustiala and Victor's (2004) notion of 9 TRANSNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: MISALIGNMENTS BETWEEN REGULATION, BUSINESS MODELS AND USER PRACTICE "strategic ambiguity"). Another example is the already mentioned anti--circumvention provision in Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright treaty, which prohibits circumvention only in case a technological measure is "effective". This allows for interpretations ranging from very broad,
i.e. effective in the sense of "in place", to very narrow, i.e. effective in the sense of "potent".
This is also an example of how ambiguity increases regulatory uncertainty even though provisions are relatively concrete and specific.
Taken together, regulatory asymmetries and ambiguities foster or re--introduce differences even in inter--or supranationally harmonized regulation, thereby increasing regulatory uncertainty for transnational copyright--related practices.
(c) Regulatory drift
The reasons for regulatory uncertainty discussed so far -regime complexity as well as regulatory asymmetry and ambiguity -are more or less static characteristics of regulatory complexes in a certain field, which potentially obscure the demarcation line between legal and illegal at any given time. Logical consequence of these uncertainties is the growing importance of courts and other arbitral authorities for crafting and concretizing regulation when deciding individual cases (Quack 2007) .
From a dynamic perspective on regulation, however, changes in meaning and interpretation need to be taken into account, which result from continuous (re--)application of certain legal rules. To a certain degree, applying rules necessarily results in (slight or marginal, but still) changing rules -a phenomenon referred to in the literature as "regulatory drift" (Ortmann 2010) 3 . In this context, Ortmann (2010: 206) Whether deviation in a grey zone or open rule--breaking will become accepted and legitimized as a legal practice or be defined as illegal practice, regularly becomes known only in retrospect. This also indicates, what will be the focus of the next section of this paper, namely how regulatory uncertainty may be reduced or enforced by usage practices of actors in the field.
Practicing Regulatory Uncertainty in the Field of Copyright
All three sources of regulatory uncertainty discussed so far have in common a concept of regulation that is the result of recursive processes of emergent and deliberative law--making by a distributed set of state and non--state actors (Quack 2007 When we now focus practices of non--state actors in the context of regulatory uncertainty in the field of copyright, we conceptualize 'a practice' in line with Reckwitz (2002: 249) as "a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other:
forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know--how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge." Analytically, we further distinguish two broad categories of practices: (1) regulatory practices intentionally and directly contributing to regulatory conversations sensu Black (2002) and (2) usage practices which do not directly address regulatory issues but might indirectly influence rule--making and rule--enforcement. Since the majority of the extant literature on regulatory processes deals with regulatory practices in the narrow sense 7 -even when only rarely adopting a practice perspective -we will elaborate on the second category of usage practices. More specifically, we approach them from the viewpoint of judicial practices of decision--making on cases for which the written law "on the books", i.e. international treaties and their national implementations, does not provide a clear--cut and generally accepted answer.
Even though not directly regulatory in nature, usage practices may -intentionally or unintentionally -contribute indirectly to regulatory conversations in that the respective (non--) compliance is inspiration for, subject of or even part of related regulatory practices. This is most obvious in the case of private regulation via standards (see Table 1 ), where adoption and compliance directly contribute to both legitimacy and effectiveness of the regulation, but holds to a probably lesser degree for any type of regulation, as well. The contribution of usage practices to legitimacy and effectiveness or regulation is thereby however only a side--effect. 8
In the field of copyright regulation, particularly new online usage practices have been at the center of regulatory conversations since the emergence of the Internet (see, for example, Within these conversations, regularly two distinct types of actors are differentiated that are involved in online usage practices such as consuming, sharing or interacting with content online (see Table 2 ): (a) end--users and (b) intermediaries. 9
8 Usage practices may nevertheless be strategically tied to regulatory uncertainty as demonstrated by Engau and Hoffmann (2011) in their assessment of corporate response strategies to regulatory uncertainty in the field of climate change regulation. They distinguish between a large set of potential response practices, subsumed under the four categories avoiding, reducing, adapting, and disregarding (Engau and Hoffmann 2011: 57) . However, as we will demonstrate below, usage practices need not be strategically directed at regulatory uncertainty to have an impact on the respective regulatory conversations. 9 Note that this analytical distinction may be empirically difficult or even impossible to make in the realm of new online practices such as peer-to-peer file sharing with peer-produced open source software tools. Facebook) exhibits all of the practices mentioned below uno actu.
The answers to the questions listed in Table 2 , given by either regulatory or arbitral authorities, are of importance for success or failure of related innovations and thus overall technological and economic development. Although all of the questions relate to (exceptions and limitations to) the right of communication to the public, regulatory uncertainty may stem from all three sources described in the previous section. Regime complexity is at stake when end--user and intermediary belong to jurisdictions with limitations and exceptions of different scope. The scope of these limitations and exceptions may in turn empower some actors while disadvantaging others and prone to changes -regulatory drift -over time. Is providing tools for interacting/creating with online content legal? Table 2 : Online usage practices of end--users and intermediaries and respective questions of (il--)legality.
As described, for example, by Wu (2010) , specifically the history of modern telecommunication markets has been regularly shaped not only by legislation but also by litigation (see, for Especially the last two cases are instructive since both services did not directly host copyrighted materials without consent of the rights holders but fostered exchange by providing links to such content hosted by end--users ("peers"). Such 'secondary infringement', i.e. fostering infringement by others, was also an issue in trials involving end--users linking to content placed online without consent of the rights holder (e.g. Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry; ) or to material in conflict with anti--circumvention provisions (e.g. Universal City
Studies v. Corley, see While we cannot go into the details of the cases listed in Table 3 , we can draw at least three conclusions from this brief overview. First, only consumption in the most narrow sensewatching, listening, and reading by end--users -has not been subject of legal controversies in court. Second, consumption in a broader sense, understood as usage practices prevalent among large crowds -if not the majority -of end--user such as linking, storing or interacting with content online (see Yar 2005) , has now continuously inspired legal controversy over the past decade and across different jurisdictions. Third, in the majority of cases the plaintiffs are representatives of established ("old") industry actors (e.g. Universal Music, Viacom, Warner Bros.) seeking to protect their business model against both new intermediaries and new end--user practices; directly and on a relatively broad scale targeting end--users not only via marketing and education efforts but also via litigation 22 is thereby a comparably new phenomenon, whereas legal battles against new intermediaries have always accompanied technological change and innovation (Wu 2010) . 23 The national character of these individual decisions may, however, lead to inconsistencies and thus even greater regulatory uncertainty in that different interpretations in this decentralized process of law--making feed back into the overall uncertainty and ambiguity of the respective copyright provisions. It is this transnational dimension that we will focus on in the subsequent section.
Transnational Regulation and Transnational Practices
Whether differences and contradictions between regulatory regimes and the respective decisions increase overall regulatory uncertainty, depends on the degree to which actors and practices span these different regimes. In the realm of copyright, regime complexity was and still is not so much a problem for activities restricted to one national jurisdiction; differences between transnational regimes are mediated and thus "resolved" via the specific national regulatory regime. However, as soon as activities transcend these national borders -something which has become ubiquitous for copyright related online practices -regime complexity increases regulatory uncertainty.
In terms of regulatory practices, transnational legal networks of private and public actors such as international arbitration courts (Lehmkuhl 2003) , intergovernmental and non--governmental organizations as well as national governments and transnational epistemic communities (Dobusch and Quack 2010) , provide the interaction context for building and developing an Especially the first of those regulatory practices, contractual innovation, is heavily tied to transnational usage practices in that it allows engaging in legal arbitrage at the borders of multiple jurisdictions -bending of existing law included (Carruthers and Halliday 1998) .
Samuelson (2004), for example, lists implementation differences with regard to copyright protection for software 24 and for DVD region codes 25 as cases for potential legal arbitrage, where high--protection rules of one country (e.g. U.S.) may be undermined by lower--protection rules of other countries (e.g. EU).
Another example mentioned by Samuelson (2004: 229f.) , peer--to--peer (P2P) file sharing technologies, is even more instructive. As described above, both end--users and developers of P2P software have regularly been subject of legal controversy both inside and outside court. In 
Conclusions and Outlook
In his assessment of global 'movie piracy', Yar (2005: 677) describes a "piracy epidemic" as being "the product of shifting legal regimes, lobbying activities, rhetorical manoeuvres, criminal justice agendas, and 'interested' or 'partial' processes of statistical inference". In doing so, he juxtaposes and contrasts his "social constructionist" perspective with a prevalent "realist" view, which explains "the 'rise of piracy' as the outcome of a range of social, economic, political and technological changes." In our paper, we attempt to go one step further. Not only is the debate around piracy manufactured and therefore socially constructed but the demarcation between legal and illegal -as a precondition for speaking about piracy in the first place -is so, as well.
Paradoxically, this re--introduces a realist notion in a social constructionist perspective. In transnational legal fields such as copyright regulation, there is no single authority with the power to definitively decide whether certain practices are legal or illegal. As a consequence, not only the weak but also the most potent actors need to engage in regulatory conversations construing legality and illegality of internet usage practices. What is considered an illegal practice has changed over time (see, for example, Wu 2010) and is likely to change in the future. BUSINESS MODELS AND USER PRACTICE In this context, one needs to be aware of the fact that proponents and opponents of extended copyright legislation and online copyright enforcement are using notions of legality and illegality for the purpose of strategically framing their aims and arguments in social struggles.
Part of these struggles are presentations of copyright issues as being "resolved", certain usage practices being definitely "illegal" or "legal". A closer look at the literature, however, reveals that in many fields -even for legal practitioners -it is still very unclear and highly contested what is legal and illegal.
While public discourse on internet piracy and consuming illegal primarily focuses on end--users, our analysis rather suggests that many of the jurisdictional controversies about usage practices are currently fought out around intermediaries. Many of these intermediaries are experimenting with new business models and innovative technologies. While some of these new platforms such as YouTube achieved great legitimacy in spite of a substantial proportion of (seemingly) infringing usage practices (Shenkman 2008) , others such as providers of P2P file sharing technologies have failed in gaining similar legitimacy in spite of a substantial share of non--infringing usage practices. None of these business models or innovative technologies is or has been by definition and ex ante "illegal". Yet, notions of legality and illegality might be strategically used by competitors from incumbent or "old" industries with the aim to prevent new market entrants.
Lastly, our study of the regulatory uncertainty surrounding online usage practices sheds a different light on so--called "internet piracy". How shall everyday internet users, mainly concerned with their immediate goals of consuming, sharing or interacting with online contents of all kinds, easily determine whether their practices are 'legal' or 'illegal', when lawyers, judges, and legislators in different national jurisdictions disagree on these issues and novel technologies are escaping the scope of previously existing law anyway? So far we know only very little about the perceptions and strategies of end--users vis--à--vis the legality of their practices (see, for a notable exception, Bajde 2010). It would be interesting to study how end--users perceive the legality of their practices, to which extent they justify their practices as "civil opposition" to overwhelmingly powerful economic actors from the US media industry (Leung 20 OSGOODE CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 08 NO.04] 2006) or as justified ignorance vis--à--vis incomprehensibly complex transnational law. It would also be an interesting topic for further research to investigate to which degree campaigns of the US media industry against piracy have contributed to a transnational collective identity in user communities and facilitated collective action.
